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Current and Possible Future International Rules Relating to
Trade Adjustment Policies - Subsidies, Safeguards, Trade
Adjustment Assistance: A View From Canada
Richard S. Gottlieb*
Debra P. Steger**
DarrelH. Pearson***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Achieving a balance in international trade between the benefits for a
domestic economy arising from trade liberalization and the difficulties
of adjustment for particular firms or industries is always difficult. The
recent signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") has
focused the attention of many Canadians on the adjustment implications
for many industrial sectors of adapting to freer trade. The on-going tariff
reductions resulting from successive General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") rounds, and proposals in the Uruguay Round to reduce non-tariff barriers in many areas, including agriculture, services and
investment, are also contributing to fears about the ability of Canadian
industries to meet increased import competition.
Structural change is never easily achieved in an economy, especially
when it is required as a result of governmental action that opens up the
domestic market to foreign competition. Governments seem to devote
more attention to negotiating reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers
than to developing non-distorting policy responses to the changes effected by trade liberalization. An unfortunate result of the general lack
of foresight and planning for structural adjustment necessitated by new
trade agreements is that governments often find themselves responding
on an ad hoc basis to industries or firms clamoring for increased protectionism, shielding them from the impact of change. By not planning
ahead and developing pro-active policies to deal with adjustment, governments are defenseless against pressures for specific relief measures.
A.

FTA Treatment
The experience to date with the FTA is a case in point. Nowhere in
the FTA is the issue of trade adjustment policies specifically addressed;
nor was any agreement reached nor rules devised respecting government
* Partner, Gottlieb, Kaylor & Stocks, Montreal, Canada.
** of Fraser & Beatty.
** of Fraser & Beatty.
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assistance measures, generally. Chapter 19 commits Canada and the
United States to establish a Working Party to develop a common system
of trade laws applicable in both countries over the next five to seven
years. The chapters on services and investment provide that the obligations contained therein, including the national treatment obligation, do
not apply to the provision of subsidies by government, the creation of tax
measures or incentives, or government procurement practices. With the
exception of the above-noted provisions, the FTA is curiously silent on
the question of government assistance to industries affected by freer
trade.
Did the parties consider it best to leave the matter to be dealt with,
for example, under countervailing duty laws, if applicable? Were the
parties reluctant to create a precedent by excepting "adjustment assistance" from countervailable action? Aside from the issue of monetary
assistance to affected industries, the FTA does, however, provide for
"emergency actions," otherwise known as "safeguards" or "escape
clause" measures. Safeguards are measures which a government may use
to provide temporary import relief to a domestic industry seriously injured by a sudden increase in imports.
In this Paper, we propose to examine the possible adjustment policies available to governments and, in particular, to examine the mechanisms used by and options available to the Government of Canada. It is
our view that the Canadian Government's response in the past has often
been to react to protectionist pressures by imposing quantitative import
restraints or temporary tariff protection or by creating new duty remission programs rather than developing adjustment assistance policies
aimed at encouraging Canadian industries to become more competitive.
B.

Framework Policies

Private firms respond to increased international competition by rationalizing or better organizing their productive resources. Generally
speaking, industrial adjustment takes place within a complex set of laws
and regulations designed to accommodate change. The Economic Council of Canada, in its 1988 statement, outlined two broad types of adjustment policies: "framework policies," which are of general application
and economy-wide in scope, and "sector-specific policies," which are
targeted at specific industries. National framework policies include unemployment insurance, worker training and mobility programs, regulations governing labour-management relations, competition policies,
business and corporate laws as well as policies directed at the growth and
level of output, employment and prices. International framework policies include the rules of the GATT. "Framework policies," observed the
Economic Council:
facilitate the movement of labour and capital from slower-growing towards faster-growing industries. By providing an environment within
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which market processes can function efficiently and effectively, framework policies let market signals indicate where returns are the highest
and where they are the lowest, and thus where resources should be
directed. For example, unemployment insurance and training programs enable individuals to find and enter the growth areas more easily. In the same way, programs designed to disseminate information
on new technology and marketing niches make firms aware of new
opportunities. In response to the pressures for change, these policies
thus nudge the economy towards a new combination of output and
employment in which overall economic activity can be maximized. 1
Framework policies, however, do not always work and, when they do,
they are often perceived as working too slowly. Therefore, governments
often respond to demands from particular interest groups on an ad hoc
basis by targeting specific programs at groups of workers, industries or
firms that are adversely affected or by providing relief to particular industries in the form of quotas, tariffs or duty remission programs.
Sectoral measures range from instruments of "positive adjustment" to
the "new protectionism." "Positive adjustment attempts to accommodate, facilitate and promote adjustment along the path indicated by competitive pressures, while new protectionism arrests,
thwarts, or retards
2
the pressures from international competition."
C. Positive-AdjustmentAssistance
The Economic Council places special government assistance programs adopted to encourage re-employment, including worker training
programs, and income compensation for selected groups, such as workers
or shareholders, in the positive adjustment category. In Canada, there
are many federal and provincial government financial assistance or incentive programs available to encourage investment in production. Not only
are funds available to subsidize production in Canada, but remission of
customs duties has been liberally granted on imported machinery and
equipment, materials and components, to ease difficulties experienced by
producers in the first few years of production or to make them more
competitive with imports.
Quantitative import restraints applied as a safeguard measure and
imposed only for a temporary period would also be considered positive
adjustment mechanisms. However, quantitative or other import restrictions imposed for long or indefinite periods, industry or firm-specific subsidies used to shore up firms, and tariff measures or duty remission
programs intended to reduce the impact of imports on an unproductive
industry, are considered protectionist policies.
While there are established procedures in Canada for the imposition
I ECON. COUNCIL OF CAN., MANAGING ADJUSTMENT -

INDUSTRIES 2-3 (1988).
2 Id.at 5.
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of import restrictive measures, such as tariff surcharges or quantitative
restrictions under safeguard laws, there is no provision in Canadian law
for government agencies to recommend, or to direct the government to
grant relief in the form of trade adjustment assistance to workers or firms
as an alternative policy option. Also, there are no specific legislative
guidelines to assist the federal government in selecting appropriate subsidy or labour adjustment programs in response to trade liberalization.
The lack of legislative guidelines in these areas is part of the reason why
the federal government appears often to respond in an ad hoc manner to
specific political or interest group pressures. Moreover, the apparent failure of the Government of Canada to develop a comprehensive adjustment response, involving labour and firm adjustment assistance
programs in the FTA, also demonstrates the lack of government attention to the specific problems of industrial adjustment to trade
liberalization.
D.

Resort to ProtectionistTrade Laws

While the effect of Canadian trade laws can be rather severe and
create a burden on exporters to and importers into Canada, the incidence
of imposition of quantitative restrictions has been limited in recent years
to textiles, clothing and footwear. By and large, the government has preferred that industry avail itself of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
legislation.
Save for a short-lived surcharge on imported bicycles a number of
years ago, we are unaware of any surcharge having been imposed on any
prodluct as a result of an injury type proceeding. However, a recent application by certain Canadian wine producers' groups under section 59(2)
of the Customs Tariff Act seeks surcharge and quota relief. More frequently, Canadian producers have resorted to proceedings designed to
bring about withdrawal of General Preferential Tariff status now held
under the Customs Tariff Act. Also, there have been an increasing
number of countervailing duty cases in recent years - mainly in the
food, agriculture and steel sectors. The main target for these actions
have been the European Community ("EC"), followed by Brazil, Spain
and the United States.
Clearly and undisputably, the most frequently invoked Canadian
trade law is anti-dumping legislation under the Special Imports Measures
Act ("SIMA") and its predecessor, the Anti-Dumping Act. The main
targets have been Korea, Japan and Taiwan. To a lesser, but not insubstantial, degree have been certain European countries: West Germany,
Spain and Italy, and also the United States.
It is not surprising that it has been Canada which has been the most
concerned during the FTA negotiations with amendment of trade laws
on a bilateral basis. Inter alia, this was provoked by a number of proceedings launched against Canadian exports early in the Mulroney re-
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gime as well as the potential effect on Canada of proposed U.S. restrictive
trade legislation. The importance of accessing the U.S. market without
possible invocation of U.S. trade laws was a key, if somewhat naive, objective of the Canadian negotiating team.
In terms of impact on exporters, the U.S. initiatives against Canadian exports have been more substantial than Canadian proceedings
against U.S. exports. For example, in the period from 1980-86, there
were thirty-one Canadian anti-dumping and one countervailing duty investigations initiated involving U.S. products and seventeen U.S. antidumping and thirteen countervailing duty investigations involving Canadian products.
II.

A.

SUBSIDIES AND DUMPING PRACTICES

The GATT Position

The extent to which governments may use subsidies as a trade adjustment policy or for other purposes is conditioned by the rules of the
GATT. Article VI of the GATT recognizes the right of Contracting
Parties to levy countervailing duties on imports of subsidized products
which are causing or threatening to cause material injury to an established domestic industry. The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of GATT (the "Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties Code") signed as a result of the Tokyo Round in
1979, provides a two track system for international discipline of tradedistorting subsidization measures. Track I sets out the procedures and
substantive rules to be followed by countries when applying their domestic countervailing duty laws. Track II provides certain multilateral obligations concerning the use of subsidy measures, notification of subsidies,
and multilateral mechanisms for consultation, conciliation and dispute
settlement.
The signatories to the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code
were deliberately ambiguous about the types of subsidy programs which
are to be considered trade-distorting and, therefore, worthy of international discipline, and the types of programs that are not. The only guidance provided by the signatories is contained in Track II, particularly in
articles 8-11. The Code contains a commitment by the signatories to not
grant export subsidies on products other than certain products. With
respect to primary products, the signatories agreed not to grant export
subsidies in a manner which results in the country granting the subsidy
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in the product. With respect to domestic subsidies, i.e., those not designed to encourage, or conditioned upon, export of a product, the signatories
recognized that such subsidies are often widely used as important instruments for promoting social and economic policy objectives. Of specific
relevance to our discussion are the provisions of article II which include
as such objectives: facilitating the restructuring, under socially accepta-
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ble conditions, of certain sectors especially where this has become necessary by reason of changes in economic policies, including international
agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade as well as sustaining employment and encouraging re-training and change in employment
patterns.
The Code signatories also recognized, however, that domestic subsidies may cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or may nullify other benefits occurring to another
signatory as a result of the GAIT. The signatories emphasized, therefore, that where domestic subsidies might adversely affect the "conditions of normal competition" or have "possible adverse effects on trade,"
such programs should be avoided.
B.

CanadianDefinition of Subsidies

Subsection 2(1) of SIMA defines subsidy as being:
any financial or other commercial benefit that has accrued or will accrue, directly or indirectly, to persons engaged in the production, manufacture, growth, processing, purchase, distribution, transportation,
sale, export or import of goods, as a result of any scheme, program,
practice or thing done, provided or implemented by the government of
a country other than Canada, but does not include the amount of any
duty or internal tax imposed on goods by the government of the country of origin or country of export from which the goods, because of
their exportation from the country of export or country of origin, have
been exempted to have been or will be relieved by means of refund or
drawback.
As is apparent from the foregoing, the Canadian law visualizes virtually
every possible governmental assistance program.
C. EC Treatment of Subsidies
In the Treaty of Rome, which established the EC, subsidies or "aids
granted by States" are dealt with in the chapter dealing with competition
rules. Article 92 of the Treaty provides that:
any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
In the EC Treaty and regulations made under it, specific rules are
provided outlining the types of subsidy programs that are always compatible with the Common Market, those programs that may be considered to be compatible if approved by the European Commission, and
those programs that are not compatible. A monitoring and enforcement
mechanism is also established. The European Commission reviews proposed subsidy programs prior to their implementation, and when a mem-
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ber state does not comply with an order of the Commission, the
Commission may seek enforcement of its order in the European Court.
The standard adopted in the Treaty of Rome concerning the acceptability of subsidy practices is essentially a competition standard.
D.

Subsidies Under the FTA

Unfortunately, in the FTA the rules on subsidies were not worked
out. Although there was some discussion in the negotiations about abolishing the anti-dumping laws and moving to a domestic price discrimination and predatory pricing standard, no specific commitments were made
in this regard. Although Canada and the United States have agreed to
develop a new system of trade rules over the next five to seven years,
there is no specific statement in the F1TA that the objective should be to
work toward a competition standard. As tariff and non-tariff barriers are
reduced in the free trade area, greater emphasis should be placed on the
effect of certain private pricing practices or government assistance programs on competition in the North American market. The focus of the
trade laws, historically, has been on protecting domestic producers rather
than encouraging competition in the economy as a whole.
E.

How Can a Rationalized CanadianProducerBe Protected?

An issue of some interest is whether or not it is possible to protect,
in Canada, a Canadian producer who is part of a "rationalized" industry
or entity, or a Canadian producer whose goods are primarily sold in foreign markets. Rationalization can take place in one of two ways. The
company may rationalize itself so as to produce as much of its product as
is possible in the cheapest (cost of production) location and, in such a
fashion, it divides its production, locating it in more than one country.
Alternatively, the company may fully rationalize producing all of its
product in one location and export a larger or greater share of its production to the other country. In either case, under SIMA, and given the
small size of the Canadian market, difficulties arise in making a case of
material injury caused by imports into Canada.
Consider the North American automotive industry. Certain people
would question the claim that North American automobile producers are
truly rationalized. More than eighty percent of Canadian production is
exported and more than seventy-five to eighty percent of Canadian demand is satisfied by imports. As a result, it was argued in the recent
Hyundai case that the impact of third country exports (whether or not
dumped or subsidized) could have little impact on Canadian- production
destined for export. At the same time, such exports could have a considerable impact on imports of Canadian producers designed to serve Canadian market demands.
An extension of this situation occurs when virtually no Canadian
market need is being supplied by Canadian production but, rather, all of
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Canadian production is exported to, inter alia, countries served by the
same exporters accused of disrupting the Canadian market. This may
have meaning within the context of capital goods cases.
Article 12 of the Anti-Dumping Code appears to provide a remedy
for situations where two countries are being affected or, more notably,
where a second country's production is affected by exports into a first
country. Country A, whose production is affected by imports into Country B, may petition Country B to conduct an investigation and consider
the effects of the alleged dumping on the industry concerned in A, as well
as the effects on the producers in Country B. At this time, however,
Canadian law has not adopted these provisions of the GATT.
It would be interesting to see whether Canada and the United States
will seek to modify their respective legislation to deal with rationalized
industry matters since the FTA will surely lead to more rationalization.
III.

A.

SAFEGUARDS

TariffSurchargesor Quotas Under the GATT

Another important trade adjustment mechanism is the use of safeguard measures, such as tariff surcharges or quotas, as sanctioned under
article XIX of the GATT. Article XIX provides an "escape hatch" or
emergency mechanism for releasing governments from their GATT obligations when there is a need to alleviate serious adjustment difficulties
encountered by domestic producers as a result of trade liberalization.
Article XIX was intended to apply only to situations where an increase
in imports was occasioned by tariff reductions or other concessions made
in the GATT. Measures are supposed to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner against imports from all countries. Furthermore, article
XIX provides that foreign suppliers may retaliate or be compensated for
loss resulting from restricted market access.
Article XIX, however, has rarely been applied in the way in which it
was intended. In the first case, the Hatters' Fur case involving an action
by the United States against Czechoslovakia, the GATT panel ignored
the causal link between injury and concessions made in the GATT. Article XIX is applied in practice in cases where imports are increasing and
are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.
A second major criticism that has developed from practical experience with article XIX is that it has been applied in a selective manner
against specific countries rather than against imports from all sources.
The issue of selectivity has been a major stumbling block in recent
GATT negotiations. One of the major disappointments of the Tokyo
Round was that the Contracting Parties were not able to agree to a new
Safeguards Code. A committee was established at the close of the Tokyo
Round with the objective to develop new rules and procedures to provide
greater uniformity and certainty in implementing article XIX. Develop-
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ing a comprehensive Safeguards Code is a major subject in the Uruguay
Round.
In a recent article on safeguards in the Uruguay Round, Gary
Sampson observed:
Article XIX in many ways holds the key to the success or failure of the
Uruguay Round. Governments will not roll back existing trade barriers and stand still in the face of demands for new ones if there is no
safety valve to permit them to deal
3 with seriously injured producers in
a politically acceptable manner.
Not surprisingly, Sampson recommends in his article the adoption of a
general competition standard rather than the objective of protection of
domestic producers. He summarizes his message as follows:
Whether governments protect producers from serious injury has little
to do with GATT. The decision is a national choice that has to be
made, and governments should take it bearing in mind all interests not
just those of injured producers. In this process, it is possible to
strengthen the hand of government (make it more politically palatable)
in resisting pressures for protection (and public assistance more generally). This could be done if the decisions were taken after public scrutiny of a "balance sheet"....

There would be very few protective

actions if serious injury referred to national interests rather than those
of injured producers. On compensation, there is a case for compensating foreign suppliers that goes beyond equity considerations. While
the payment of compensation is not in the interest of the country considering the safeguard action, the obligation to pay compensation
strengthens the hand of importing country government over the electorate in resisting claims for protection. The idea of retaliation (compensation) by the exporting country's raising its trade barriers to products
originating in the country experiencing injury (Article XIX) is tantamount to shooting oneself in the foot.4
B.

Tariff Surchargesor Quotas Under Canadian Law

In Canadian law, the Governor in Council may provide temporary
relief where imports are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to
Canadian producers of like or directly competitive products under section 60 of the Customs Tariff Act or section 5 of the Export and Import
Permits Act. On the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, after a
report has been made by the Minister of Finance, and an inquiry by the
Textile and Clothing Board under the Textile and Clothing Board Act,
the Governor in Council (or the Cabinet) may order that a surtax in the
form of an additional duty or a tariff-rate quota may be imposed on
goods of any kind that originate in any country, which are being im3

G. SAMPSON, THE URUGUAY ROUND -
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4 Id.
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ported into Canada under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to Canadian producers of like or directly competitive
goods. Orders made under that section may remain in effect for not
more than three years under the Customs Tariff Act, but indefinitely
under the Export and Import Permits Act, and are to be designed only to
prevent further serious injury or threat thereof. Usually, the Governor in
Council will impose safeguard measures only after an injury inquiry by
the Canadian Import Tribunal or the Textile and Clothing Board.
Where the Governor in Council makes an order pursuant only to a report of the Minister of Finance, and no injury inquiry has been made by
a tribunal, the order is to expire after 180 days unless it is either approved by a resolution adopted in both Houses of Parliament, or the Canadian Import Tribunal or the Textile and Clothing Board conducts an
inquiry and reports to the Governor in Council that the goods are still
being imported in such a manner as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to Canadian producers.
Subsection 5(2) of the Export and Import Permits Act provides the
Governor in Council with the authority to impose a quantitative restriction on imports of goods upon the recommendation of Minister of Finance after an inquiry has been made by the Textile and Clothing Board
or the Canadian Import Tribunal into whether or not such goods are
being imported or are likely to be imported into Canada at such prices, in
such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to the production in Canada of like or directly competitive goods. The Governor in Council also may, under subsections
5(3) and (4), place imported goods on the Import Control List for the
purpose of monitoring and collecting information in order to ascertain
whether or not their importation is causing or threatening to cause injury
to the production in Canada of like goods.
The Canadian Import Tribunal is given general powers in section 48
of SIMA to inquire into and report to the Governor in Council on any
matter in relation to the importation of goods into Canada that may
cause or threaten to cause injury to, or that may retard the establishment
of, the production of any goods in Canada, or the provision, by persons
normally resident outside of Canada, of services in Canada that may
cause or threaten to cause injury to, or that may retard, the provision of
any services in Canada by persons not normally resident in Canada.
Under section 17 of the Textile and Clothing Board Act, that Board
may conduct an inquiry and report to the Minister of Finance on
whether textile and clothing goods are being imported at such prices, in
such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to the production in Canada of any textile and clothing goods. The Board is required under section 17 to make a written
report to the Minister setting out the results of its inquiry and containing
a recommendation as to whether special measures of protection should
be implemented. In its inquiry, the Board is required to evaluate produ-
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cers' plans outlining the adjustments that they propose to make in their
operations in order to increase their ability to meet international competition. In making its recommendation for relief, the Board is directed to
take into account a number of domestic concerns including relevant
manpower and regional considerations in Canada; the provisions of the
GATT, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Clothing and
Textiles, and any other relevant international agreements; the effect of
any proposed measures of protection on consumers; and the principle
that special measures of protection are not to be implemented for the
purpose of encouraging the maintenance of lines of production that have
no prospect of becoming competitive with foreign goods in the Canadian
market.
C. Bill C-110
Bill C- 110, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, was introduced in Parliament on February 12, 1988. It proposes to amalgamate the three agencies responsible for international trade in Canada: the
Canadian Import Tribunal, the Textile and Clothing Board and the
Tariff Board. In section 20 of Bill C-110, the Canadian International
Trade Tribunal will be given the authority to make an inquiry and report
to the Governor in Council on any matter that may merit the granting of
temporary relief. Under section 19, the Tribunal may also inquire into
and report to the Minister of Finance on any tariff-related matter that the
Minister refers to it.
Bill C- 110 provides an entirely new procedure in Canada for domestic producers to file a private complaint with the Tribunal to initiate a
safeguard investigation. Currently, any Canadian producer of textile and
clothing goods may file a notice of complaint with the Textile and Clothing Board alleging that the importation of textile and clothing goods is
causing or threatening to cause serious injury to that company's production in Canada of any textile and clothing goods. However, similar procedures do not exist for private complaints in other safeguard cases. It is
noteworthy that Bill C-110 provides a mechanism by which any Canadianproducerof like or directly competitive goods or any person or association acting on behalf of such a producer, can file a written complaint
with the Tribunal. This complaint would allege that the imported goods
are imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers of like or
directly competitive goods. Previously, the inquiry by the Tribunal or its
predecessors was based on a reference by the Minister or the Cabinet.
The Tribunal is required to commence an inquiry upon receiving a properly documented complaint where it is satisfied that the information provided by the complainant discloses a reasonable indication that the basic
injury and causation criteria are met. The complaint must be made on
behalf of domestic producers who produce the majority of domestic production of like or directly competitive goods. The Tribunal must con-
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sider whether the goods under investigation are being imported in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to be a principal cause
or threat thereof to domestic producers.
After completing its inquiry, the Tribunal is required to report to
the Governor in Council and the Minister of Finance concerning the results of its inquiry. There is no specific authority in the Bill for the Tribunal to make a recommendation to the Minister of Finance or to the
Governor in Council for a particular form of relief. The Tribunal is to
make a report to the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Finance is,
in turn, to make a report and recommendation to the Governor in Council. It is ultimately the Minister of Finance and the Governor in Council
who will have the discretion to recommend and decide whether to provide relief and what form that relief should take.
Although Bill C- 110 reforms the area of a private party initiation of
a safeguard investigation, it does not set out specific criteria for recommending relief. What is missing in Canadian law regarding safeguards
measures, generally, is any direction to the Minister of Finance or Governor in Council to consider, in addition to tariff surcharges, tariff-rate
quotas, or quantitative restrictions, the alternative of providing trade adjustment assistance in the form of worker re-training programs or assistance to firms to encourage them to adjust to new competitive realities.
Thus, the whole focus of the Canadian safeguards laws could be seriously
criticized as providing only relief in the form of measures of protection,
rather than directing that trade adjustment assistance measures are a
preferable policy response.
It is not entirely clear what relief may be granted under this legislation. It is apparent, however, that the Canadian Import Tribunal will
provide a report to the Minister and then to the Governor in Council in
which it will express its opinion as to whether relief should be
forthcoming.
There are some anomalies in the language of the Bill. For example,
the report should identify the "principal cause of injury" whereas it suffices that the complaint indicates increased quantities or the existence or
conditions which cause or threaten to cause serious injury. By way of
contrast, quotas can be imposed under the Export/Import Permits Act
when goods are imported in such quantities and under such conditions as
to cause or threaten to cause serious injury. A surtax may be imposed
under the Customs Tariff Act when goods are being imported into Canada under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause injury.
The relief contemplated by Bill C-110 may also be available when
the Tribunal reports pursuant to a reference by the Governor in Council
or the Minister. These situations would include inquiries on any matter
in relation to the economic, trade or commercial interests of Canada;
inquiries into any tariff-related matter, including any matter concerning
the international rights or obligations of Canada; and most notably, in-
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quiries into the importation of goods into Canada that result in an import-relief action.
Canadian producers may find the complaint provisions in Bill C-1 10
to be rather attractive since:
1. There is no need to establish dumping or subsidization. In fact,
if such is found to be the cause of the injury or threat of injury alleged in
the complaint, the Tribunal must refer the matter to the Deputy Minister
of National Revenue for Customs and Excise for consideration under
SIMA.
2. It is only necessary to allege that the imported goods are being
imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury (not material injury). The complaint is to document this by providing reasonable details of the facts on
which the allegations are based, an estimate of the total percentage of
Canadian production that is produced by the domestic producers by
whom or on whose behalf the complaint is filed and whatever else is
considered useful by the complainant(s). The Tribunal may seek other
information, including that from other interested parties, prior to determining whether or not to commence its inquiry.
It remains to be seen how frequently recourse will be had in the
future to the remedies contemplated by Bill C-110, the Customs Tariff
Act and the Export and Import Permits Act provisions (under Bill C-

1io).
IV.

THE CANADA-U.S.

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

In the FTA, Canada and the United States have agreed to substantive and procedural changes in the safeguard laws applied by either country under article XIX of the GATT. Under their domestic laws, the
United States or Canada can impose border measures, including duties
and quotas on imports of a product from foreign countries where imports
are increasing in such a manner as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to a domestic industry. They are intended to provide a domestic
industry with temporary relief, an "escape hatch," where imports are increasing to such an extent as to create serious and unforeseen adjustment
difficulties for that industry.
In the FrA, Canada and the United States have agreed to a new
two-track system for safeguard actions. A special bilateral track will be
established to deal with increases in imports caused by a reduction of
duties made in the FIA. Where increasing imports of a product from
the other country alone are found to contribute to a substantial cause of
serioils injury to a domestic industry, the importing country may suspend
reduction of any duties on that product under the ITA, or increase the
duty to the lower of the current most-favored-nation rate to pre-FTA
levels. The imposition of safeguard relief measures under the bilateral
track is limited to a period of three years, may be taken only in the tran-
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sition period (i.e., until 1998), and may be taken only once for any particular product.
Substantial changes affecting safeguard actions involving imports
from several countries have been made in the FTA. Currently, Canadian
and U.S. domestic laws permit the imposition of measures, such as duties
or quotas, on imports of a particular product from several countries
where a sudden surge.in those imports is causing or threatening to cause
serious injury to domestic producers. The FTA provides that in a global
safeguard case, imports from Canada or the United States are to be excluded unless they are "substantial" and "contribute importantly" to the
serious injury or threat thereof caused by imports from all sources. For
imports from either country to be "substantial" in such a case, they must
represent more than five to ten percent of total imports. Also, where
safeguard measures are imposed on imports from the other country they
must not restrict the flow on imports from that country below the trend
of those imports over a reasonable recent base period with an allowance
for growth. These new standards should reduce the number of bilateral
safeguard cases between Canada and the United States.
The FTA also requires each country to notify, and where requested,
consult with the other country prior to imposing a safeguard measure
against imports of the other country. Where one country objects to a
duty, quota or other safeguard measures imposed by the other country,
the dispute settlement mechanism of the FTA may be invoked. The two
countries are to attempt first to resolve the matter by government-togovernment consultations. Where they are unable to do so, the country
affected may apply to the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission for the establishment of a binding arbitration panel to determine the matter. Any
decision made by a bi-national arbitration panel concerning a safeguard
measure is final and binding on both countries and their agencies. The
ability of an international panel to review and make binding decisions
concerning a country's application of safeguard measures under article
19 of the GATT is unprecedented international trade law.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are several ways in which the Government of Canada could
improve its current trade adjustment policies. First, we agree with the
Economic Council of Canada that subsidies and special import measures
selected to assist industries in adjusting to new competitive conditions
caused as a result of trade liberalization should lean towards the "positive adjustment" end of the policy spectrum. The purpose of adopting
particular government assistance measures or imposing temporary emergency relief measures should be to encourage and to promote adjustment
in the Canadian economy as a whole, and not to protect or cushion particular firms or industries from the impact of increased import competition for an extended period of time. In our view, there has been too little
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emphasis in Canada, particularly with respect to the FTA, on consideration of appropriate labour adjustment measures and firm and industry
subsidies to facilitate adjustment. All too often in the past, the response
of the Canadian government has been to impose quotas or duties, or to
provide special duty remission programs for Canadian industries, all of
which are trade-distorting measures. In the FTA, in particular, there has
been a surprising lack of discussion about adjustment policies, and in
particular, subsidies and programs for re-training or compensating
workers.
Canadian legislation providing for the imposition of safeguard measures also does not specifically address the alternative of providing adjustment assistance to workers, firms or industries. The general policy thrust
of the Canadian government, in our view, ought to be toward encouraging adjustment assistance programs, particularly for workers, to enable
industries to restructure and become more competitive in the face of increasing international competition.
Second, with respect to safeguard measures, we would recommend
that there be a return to the original GATT article XIX principles. Safeguard measures are intended as temporary relief to provide a breathing
space to industries injured by increased competition from imports caused
by tariff reductions or other concessions made as a result of international
trade agreements. The emphasis should be on temporary relief, and relief
that is imposed in a "most-favoured nation" manner, not selectively
against particular countries. Where a quota is selected as a temporary
relief measure, it should be global, not bilateral; temporary, not permanent; degressive, not constant; and subject to a specific termination date.
The normal procedure, whereby the Government of Canada refers an
injury inquiry to the Canadian Import Tribunal or the Textile and Clothing Board before a new quota or temporary measure is imposed, is a
commendable practice. In future, privately-initiated safeguard investigations before the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the Tribunal
should be directed to receive presentations from all sectors of the Canadian economy, rather than just the domestic producers of like products.
One option would be to provide a procedure similar to that provided in
section 45 of SIMA, whereby the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
could conduct a public interest hearing concerning a safeguards investigation after the injury inquiry had been held. In that manner, the recommendation for relief ultimately made by the Minister of Finance in such a
case would reflect the possible impact of any relief measures on the Canadian economy as a whole, and not only on the domestic industry concerned. Also, consideration should be given to allowing for adjustment
assistance relief, in appropriate cases.
Third, also with respect to safeguard measures, we would recommend that Canada continue to work in the GATT Uruguay Round to
develop a comprehensive multilateral agreement on safeguards. We
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agree with the basic objectives in the negotiating plans for safeguards in
the Uruguay Round, which are that the agreement on safeguards:
shall be based on the basic principles of the General Agreement;
shall contain inter alia the following elements: transparency, coverage, objective criteria for action including the.concept of serious injury or
threat thereof, temporary nature, degressivity and structural adjustment,
compensation and retaliation, notification, consultation, multilateral surveillance and dispute settlement;
- shall clarify and reinforce the disciplines of the General Agreement
and should apply to all contracting parties.
With respect to subsidies, it is extremely important that the Canadian Government work, both within the GATT and in negotiations with
the United States, to develop a workable system of subsidies rules. In
particular, clear, objective definitions of countervailable or actionable
subsidies are urgently required. This will be a very difficult task. The
issues are not simple, but the Government of Canada must devote sufficient resources and energy to the task of developing workable, mutually
agreeable rules so that both governments and exporters may be assured
in future of greater certainty and security in their trade relations.

